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IDENTIFICATION OF ALL PARTIES TO THE 
PROCEEDING IN THE COURT WHOSE JUDGMENT 
IS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
I. APPELLANTS 
The Appellant is Walter K. Gilmore, referred to as 
"Gilmore" herein. He was the Plaintiff in the Court 
below. 
II. RESPONDENTS 
The Respondents, Defendants in the Court below, are 
as follows: 
1. The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
a State of Utah, private, non-profit corporation, referred 
to as "The Program" hereafter; 
2. Hal J. Schultz, referred to as "Executive 
Director" hereafter; 
3. Robert E. Philbrick, referred to as "Board 
of Trustee's President" hereafter; 
4. Fred Geter, referred to as "Personnel 
Committee Chairman" hereafter; 
5. Richard Fields, referred to as "S.L.C.A.P.fs 
Personnel Administrator" hereafter; 
6. Ann O'Connell, referred to as "Former 
President of the Board of Trustees" hereafter. 
No other parties are identified as subject to this 
proceeding. 
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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Title VI, R. Utah S. Ct., petitioners 
suggest that review of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this case is appropriate. The question for 
which review is sought is whether the case, Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Inc. Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. R. 4 (1989), 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court after the Court of 
Appeals heard oral argument in this case but before its 
decision, should apply retroactively to this case. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's 
summary judgment in petitioner's favor, remanding the case 
for trial consistent with the decision ih Berube. In so 
doing, the Court of Appeals relied exclusively on the 
Berube decision. The Berube case was decided By the Utah 
Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals heard argument in 
this case but before its decision. Material to the Court 
of Appeals' decision is whether the Berube case should 
apply retroactively to this case. The Court of Appeals 
overlooked or did not consider this issue. It is the 
opinion of petitioners' counsel, based upon applicable 
law, that the Berube case should not apoly retroactively 
to this case. 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE OPINION 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for which this 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is brought is officially 
reported and may be located according to the following 
citation: Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, 110 Utah Adv. R. 51 (1989). 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH 
JURISDICTION IS INVOKED. 
The date of entry of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals sought to be reviewed is June 8, 1989. A petition 
for rehearing was timely filed by the petitioners before 
the Court of Appeals on June 21, 1989. The Court of 
Appeals entered its Order Denying Petition for Rehearing 
on July 17, 1989. The specific statutory provision 
conferring jurisdiction on this Court to review the Court 
of Appeals' decision is Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) and 
(5)(Supp. 1987). 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE 
LOWER COURTS 
This case is a civil, non-domestic dispute arising 
out of the termination of Gilmorefs employment with the 
Salt Lake Community Action Program. It was first 
instituted on April 25, 1979, in the United States 
- 2 -
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. 
Walter K. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, et al., #C-79-0258. On December 30, 1980, that 
Court granted Defendants1 motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing that action on its merits with prejudice, on 
the grounds that there was no federal jurisdiction. 
Gilmore appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit. In the decision, Gilmore v. Salt Lake 
Area Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632 (1983), the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Couiqt judgment and 
entered the judgment on April 18, 1983. Gilmore 
petitioned for a rehearing which was denied on July 27, 
1983. 16. 
On July 23, 1984, Gilmore instituted this lawsuit in 
the Third Judicial District court for Salt Lake County. 
Record at 2 (hereafter abbreviated "R".). The Court 
ordered, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, that the 
depositions and other discovery taken in the previous 
Federal Court action be filed and published in this 
action. Once published, Gilmore and Respondents filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. R. at 52 & 101. 
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions the 
parties stipulated that Gilmore's sixth, seventh, eighth 
- 3 -
and ninth causes of action would be dismissed with 
prejudice, R. at 547-549. The Court then granted 
Respondents' motion as to all of the remaining causes of 
action, thereby dismissing Gilmore's Complaint in its 
entirety, with prejudice, R. at 545 & 547-549. 
Gilmore appealed the summary judgment only as it 
pertained to his claim that the Program's written policy 
manual constituted an implied-in-fact contract that 
altered his status as an employee-at-will. The appeal was 
originally taken to the Utah Supreme Court where it was 
then poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. On July 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals 
entered its decision reversing the lower court's summary 
judgment and remanding for further proceedings. 
Respondents filed a petition for rehearing which was 
denied on July 17, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In September, 1974, the Salt Lake Community 
Action Program (Program), hired Walter K. Gilmore 
(Gilmore) as fiscal director. R. at 3 & 53; Gilmore 
Deposition at 10; 110 Utah Adv. R. at 51. 
2. Gilmore's employment with the Program was not for 
any specified duration of time. R. at 117, 575 & 581. 
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3. Gilmore does not contest that he was hired as an 
employee-at-will. 110 Utah Adv. R. at 5£. 
4. On March 14, 1911, the Program's executive 
director notified Gilmore in writing that his employment 
was being terminated due to a "reduction in force". R. at 
4 & 82. Gilmore was terminated the same day. Gilmore 
Deposition at Vol. II p. 9, 18, Ex. D-15 & D-17. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court decision, Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Inc. Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. R. 4(1989) was 
decided on March 20, 1989. 
ARGUMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
The Utah Supreme Court should reviejw the Court of 
Appeals decision by Writ of Certiorari under Rule 43(4), 
R. Utah S. Ct. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower 
court's summary judgment based solely on this court's 
decision in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Inc., Ltd., 104 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4 (1989), remanding the case for trial 
consistent therewith. The Berube case was decided after 
the Court of Appeals heard argument in this case but 
before its decision. The Court of Appeals overlooked or 
did not consider the question of whether the decision in 
Berube should apply retroactively to thi+s case. This is 
_ 5 _ 
an important question of state law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Utah Supreme Court* 
ARGUMENT 
THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD NOT APPLY 
RETROACTIVELY TO THIS CASE. 
In McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court set forth the general 
rule concerning the retroactive or prospective application 
of its decisions: 
This Court has held that "[o]rdinarily 
an overruling decision has retroactive 
operation." We have also recognized, 
however, that under some circumstances 
"an overruling decision will operate 
in the future only.1' The leading case 
establishing such a doctrine is a 
United States Supreme Court decision 
entitled Great Northern Railway v. 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. The rule 
established in that case, known as the 
Sunburst Doctrine, has been summarized 
previously by this Court as follows: 
The rule is based upon the 
proposition that where persons had 
entered into contracts and other 
business relationships based upon 
justifiable reliance on the prior 
decisions of courts, those persons 
would be substantially harmed if 
retroactive effect were given to 
overruling decisions. An additional 
factor was that retroactive 
operation might greatly burden the 
administration of justice. (Citing 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah, 
2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1972) L 
For these same reasons, the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Berube should not apply retroactively to this 
case. In the Berube case, the Utah Supreme Court 
substantially and significantly changed the at-will 
employment doctrine. Justice Durham, in the majority 
opinion stated: 
We now consider the general status of 
the at-will rule and whether it is 
appropriate for this court to extend 
or adopt further exceptions toJ the 
rule . . . Although in the pa|st the 
presumption in favor of at-will 
employment has been difficult Ito 
overcome, rigid adherence to the at-
will rule is no longer justified or 
advisable. 104 Utah Adv. R. at 9 & 
10. 
Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion further 
emphasized the modifying effect of the decision and its 
impact on employers. He stated: 
Because the law in this area is in a 
state of flux, and because the at-will 
doctrine has become well entrenched in 
our law and any change in it has the 
potential to affect the practices of 
almost every employer in Utah, we must 
proceed with care in recognizing 
exceptions to that doctrine. . . . 
All that being said, we are reversing 
and remanding this matter for trial and 
The citation for Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil 
^_Refining, Co. is 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 
360 (1932). 
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are signaling a change in the 
employment-at-will law of Utah. 104 
Utah Adv. R. at 16. 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that employers in the 
State of Utah have relied for many years on the employment 
at-will doctrine in hiring and firing employees. This 
State's previous rigid adherence to this doctrine is 
described in the Berube case. The Court noted: "This 
same general rule was utilized in a number of Utah cases. 
See Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 
2d 1, 5, 354 P. 2d 559, 562 (1960); Crane Co. v. Dahle, 
576 p. 2d 870, 872-73 (Utah, 1978) (citing no authority 
for the rule). Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 1979)." 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. As noted by 
Justice Zimmerman, a change in this law by which employers 
have operated, "will affect the practices of almost every 
employer in Utah." 104 Utah Adv. R. at 16. 
There is no dispute in this case that when the 
Program hired Gilmore he was hired as an employee-at-wi11. 
110 Utah Adv. R. at 52. Of particular interest is the 
fact that Gilmore was hired 15 years and terminated 12 
years before the decision in the Berube case. The 
program, in entering into this at-will relationship, had 
no reason to believe that twelve years later Gilmore's 30 
months of employment would evolve into something more than 
what the parties intended or have admitted the 
- 8 -
relationship to be. Based upon the employment at-will 
doctrine, adhered to by the courts of this State at the 
time, the program had no reason to believe or know that 
twelve years later it would face the possibility of paying 
Gilmore substantial damages, based on a theory of law 
which was not recognized as an exception to at-will 
employment until 1989. If this new law is applied 
retroactively, the program faces the possibility of 
judgment for Gilmorefs back pay in a catastrophic amount. 
As a result, applying the Berube decision retroactively to 
this case is fundamentally unfair and unjust. 
In other jurisdictions the courts have ruled that 
modifications to the employment at-will doctrine will 
operate prospectively only. For example, in the case 
Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 644 F. Supp. 
1033 (D.N.J. 1986), a nurse alleged, in one cause of 
action, that the hospital's personnel policies manual 
constituted an implied employment contract. During the 
pendency of the Bimbo case the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recognized, for the first time, an exception to the 
traditional employment-at-will doctrine based on a 
contract implied from a personnel policy manual. Woolley 
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 49 A.2d 1257 
(1985). The Federal District Court in Bimbo held: 
- 9 -
In so holding, the Woolley court, to 
the extent it went beyond ruling only 
that fundamental principles of basic 
fairness must be adhered to in 
employment relationships clearly broke 
new ground in New Jersey employment 
law. As such, the Woolley decision, 
in our opinion, should not be applied 
retroactively. To apply such a 
significant change in the law 
retroactively would be distinctly 
unfair to those effected thereby who 
had previously acted in reliance upon 
the prior state of the law. 644 F. 
Supp. at 1039. 
The court went on to note that the facts giving rise to 
plaintiff's complaint arose more than three years before 
2 
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Woolley. 
In Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983), 
the New Mexico Court of Appeals also modified the 
employment at-will doctrine by recognizing for the first 
time an exception when a termination contravenes some 
clear mandate of public policy. The Court held: 
Because this new cause of action 
imposes significant new duties, and 
because of reliance on the long 
standing terminable at-will rule, we 
hold that the new law should be given 
modified prospective application. 
Thus, we apply the law announced to 
2 
In later cases, Cole v. Carteret Savings Bank, 540 A.2d 
923 (N.J. Super. L. 1988) and Grigoletti v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical, 545 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1988), the 
New Jersey Superior Courts disagreed with the holding in 
the Bimbo case on the basis that there was no reliance on 
the prior state of the law. 
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the case before us, except as to 
punitive damages, and to prospective 
cases filed after the date this 
decision becomes final. 699 P.2d at 
621-622. 
See also: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 838 F.2d 1411 (5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. City 
of Bisbee, Arizona, 855 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramey 
v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978); Adkins v. Sky 
Blue, Inc. 701 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly broke new ground in 
Utah employment law by its decision in Berube. Before 
Berube, the at-will employment doctrine was "well 
entrenched in our law." 104 Utah Adv. R. at 16. Now 
employers face significant new duties and liabilities in 
its relationships with employees. For several decades 
prior to Berube, the program and other employers acted in 
accordance with the state of the law at that time. It is 
distinctly unfair to now subject the program to 
potentially catastrophic liability based on a change in 
the law that occurred at least twelve years after the 
facts. This court therefor should rule that the Berube 
decision does not apply retroactively tq this case. 
- 11 -
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Petitioners respectfully urge the Utah Supreme 
Court to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and 
affirm the lower Court's summary judgment dismissing 
Gilmore's breach of Contract claims against all 
Respondents with prejudice, and an award of Respondents' 
costs pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah S. Ct. 
CERTIFICATION 
John K. Rice and Stephen W. Cook certify that this 
petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not 
for delay. 
DATED this /c day of Jjc 4,
 c: C 1989. 
J/.rf:2?L<-
JOHN K. RICE 
attorney for Respondents 
^<-
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Respondents 
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CODE• CO 
Provo, Utah 
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
110 Utah Adv. Rep 51 51 
the court improperly found that the parties 
had about $780 in their checking account and 
divided that amount between Anna and Vla-
dimir. Anna testified that on the day she left 
Vladimir, she went to the bank and checked 
the balance in the account and the balance was 
about $780. A bank statement was admitted 
into evidence which indicates end of day bal-
ances on April 8 of $781.78, April 9 of 
$677.09, and $32.00 on April 10. Anna's tes-
timony is somewhat unclear as to exactly 
which day she left, but nevertheless, we find it 
within the court's discretion to determine that 
each party was entitled to half of the amount 
in the account on the approximate date of 
their separation. We also find no error in the 
remainder of the court's order regarding the 
parties' assets and debts. 
Affirmed in part and reversed and rema-
nded in part. The parties shall bear their own 
costs of this appeal. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
110 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 
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SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY ACTION 
PROGRAM, Eal J. Shultz, Robert E. 
Pimbnck, Fred Geter, Richard Fields, Ann 
O'Conneii, John Does 1-30, 
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No. Case No. 870395-CA 
FILED: Juae 8, 1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Nann Novinski-Durando and Mark S. Miner, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
John K. Rice and Stephen W. Cook, Midvale, 
for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and 
Greenwood. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff Walter K. Gilmore appeals from 
entry of summary judgment for defendants in 
an action for wrongful terntiination of empl-
oyment. Gilmore contends that his former 
employer's written policy n^anual constitutes 
an implied-in-fact contract that altered his 
status as an employee-att-will. Since the 
existence of an implied-in-fbct contract is a 
question of fact, we conclude that summary 
judgment was inappropriately entered. We, 
therefore, reverse and remand. 
Defendant Salt Lake Area Community 
Action Program (Program |s a private, non-
profit Utah corporation. Through federal 
funding, it administers various neighborhood 
programs such as "Head Start/ Authority is 
delegated to the executive director, defendant 
Hal J. Shultz, through its cohtroiling board of 
trustees (Board). This authority includes the 
power to hire and fire employees, subject to 
review by the Board's personnel committee. 
In September 1974, the Program hired 
Gilmore as fiscal director. Gilmore does not 
recall any terms or conditions of employment, 
other than a six-month probationary period. 
Gilmore received a copy Of the Program's 
"Personnel Policies Manual" (Manual) some-
time after his probationary period had ended. 
As the result of an audit for the fiscal year 
ending March 1976, a deficit of $9,800 was 
discovered, and a decision was made to com-
puterize Giimore's department. Shultz later 
discovered additional accounting discrepancies 
that indicated the total deficit to be over 
$46,000. Shultz then met yich Gilmore and 
informed him that Gilmore'k job could be in 
jeopardy unless the deficiencies in his accou-
nting were corrected. At the end of the year, 
Shultz proposed to the Board that the fiscal 
staff be reduced, but that Gilmore remain as 
office manager. The Board rejected this pro-
posal. An alternative proposal to reorganize 
Giimore's department was implemented in 
March 1977, and an accounting supervisor was 
hired. Shultz assumed (giimore's policy-
making duties; the new accounting supervisor 
assumed Giimore's remaining duties and rec-
eived similar compensation. 
On March 14, 1977, Shultz notified Gilmore 
in writing that his employment was being eli-
minated due to a "reduction in force." 
Gilmore appealed the decision in a letter to 
Shultz, who denied the appeal and referred 
Gilmore to the personnel committee. An 
immediate hearing was scheduled, and the 
committee took statements from Shultz and 
Gilmore. Neither Shultz nor Gilmore was 
present while the other gave his statement. 
Shultz also gave the committee an outline of 
his reasons for dismissing Gilmore. On April 
14, defendant Fred Getcr, chairman of the 
personnel committee, informed Gilmore by 
letter that the termination had been upheld. 
Further rehearings were denied. 
Gilmore subsequently wrote to the Comm-
unity Services Administration (CSA), the 
major federal grantor to the Program, alleging 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
M Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area 
5 Z 110 Utah, 
that personnel policies and procedures conta-
ined in the Manual were not followed. 
Gilmore requested an investigation. CSA ult-
imately determined ,that the Program had 
violated its own procedures and CSA regula-
tions as outlined in the Manual. The 
Program's funding was reduced by 10% for 
two years, but CSA apparently never enforced 
this sanction. 
Gilmore filed a federal civil rights suit 
against the Program, its Board, and its empl-
oyees in early 1979. The U.S. District Court 
for Utah granted summary judgment for def-
endants and dismissed the action for lack of 
federal jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals subsequently affirmed the judg-
ment. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Comm-
unity Action Program, 710 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 
1983). Gilmore's petition for rehearing was 
denied. 
Gilmore filed this action in 1984. The 
parties stipulated that depositions taken in the 
federal action be filed 'and published in the 
instant case. After I cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court granted 
defendants' motion. On appeal, the parties do 
not contest that Gilmore was hired as an 
employee-at-will. Gilmore argues, however, 
that the Manual constituted an implied-in-
fact promise that altered his status as an at-
will employee. 
Summary judgment must oe supported by 
evidence, admissions, and inferences establis-
hing "that there is no issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
After reviewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the opposing party, we will 
reverse the trial court's determination if we 
conclude that there is a dispute as to a mate-
rial issue of fact. Creekview Apartments v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 
App. 1989). We conclude in this case that 
material issues of fact remain unresolved, and, 
therefore, summary judgment was erroneously 
granted. 
Utah has followed the general common law 
rule that personal employment contracts are 
terminable at the will of either party "in the 
absence of some further express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of the employ-
ment or of a good consideration in addition to 
the services contracted to be rendered." 
Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055, 
1057 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Bihlmaier v. 
Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979)). Until 
recently, the existence of implied promises that 
would alter the at-will relationship required 
conduct manifesting the mutual assent of the 
parties to be bound by those terms. Bruno, 
747 P.2d at 1058. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held, however, that rigid adherence to this 
rule is no longer justified. See Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 
10 (1989) (employment-at-will creates a 
ommunity Action Program CODE^ CO 
v Rep 51 Provo, Utah 
rebuttable presumption that employment 
having no specified duration may be termin-
ated without just cause). An employee can 
now rebut the presumption of at-will empl-
oyment by affirmatively showing that the 
parties expressly or impliedly intended to alter 
the relationship. Id. Evidence of such an int-
ention may be derived from employment 
manuals, oral agreements, the conduct of the 
parties, announced personnel policies, pract-
ices of a particular trade or industry, and 
other circumstances. Id. at 10-11. Whether 
there are sufficient indicia to rebut the presu-
mption is a "question of fact." Id. at 11. 
In this case, there are factual questions that 
remain unresolved. Although the Program 
hired Gilmore as an at-will employee', it later 
issued him a Manual that allegedly defined the 
conditions under which his employment could 
be terminated. The Manual evidently outlined 
appeal and discipline procedures to be foll-
owed by Gilmore and the Program. These 
policies and procedures may, depending on the 
facts, limit the Program's right to terminate 
Gilmore's employment. Because these factual 
issues are clearly material to the nature of 
Gilmore's employment contract, summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
In order to determine the nature of the 
employment contract, the court should cons-
ider the intent of the parties and the totality of 
the circumstances. Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 
719 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1986). In the course of 
its analysis, the court may need to determine 
whether issuance of the Manual constituted an 
intentional surrender of the Program's right 
to discharge Gilmore at-will. See Bruno, 747 
P.2d at 1058. It may also be necessary to 
determine whether there was an implied term 
in the Manual, and, if so, whether the term 
was expressly disavowed, or whether the 
Program substantially complied with the 
Manual. See Berube, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
14. 
Summary judgment is reversed and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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